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ABSTRACT
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despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders,many borrowers
have been able to consistently negotiate for reducedrepayments. This paper
presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determinesrepayment
levels.
We derive a bargaining equilibrium in which countries withlarge debts
achieve negotiated partial default. The ability tocredibly threaten more
draconian penalties in the event of repudiationmay be of no benefit to
lenders. Furthermore, unanticipated increases in world interestrates may
actually help the borrowers by making lenders more impatient for anegotiated
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without their intervention.
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I. Introduction
Over the past several years, a large number of less-developed countries haverepeatedly
"rescheduled" their payments on loans from Western banks.1 Thesereschedulings have
typically involved only a postponement of payments (with interest) rather thanoutright
repudiation, but many observers are skeptical whether the loans will ever berepaid in
full. In the (limited) secondary market for LDC loans, bank loansto many countries —
particularlySouth American debtors —tradeat substantial discounts.2 There is also
evidence that anticipated LDC loan losses are reflected in the stock market values ofmajor
creditor banks.3 Given that the net external liabilities of alldeveloping countries stood at
over 950 billion dollars by the end of 1985 ,itis not surprising that the "LDC debt crisis"
has attracted a great deal of attention. (The Appendixpresents figures for some of the
major individual borrowers.)
An essential feature of sovereign lending is that creditors haveonly indirect means
to enforce repayment. As a consequence, countriesmay choose to default long before the
stage is reached where they are literally unable to pay. Economists have made substantial
progress towards understanding the special problems of sovereign lending5 but still, the
current generation of models have some fundamental limitations. The mostimportant
limitation is thay they fail to provide a satisfactory theory explainingpartial default. The
1 In 1983, 18 countries rescheduled thepayments on 61 billion dollars of debt. In 1984,
19 countries rescheduled 136 billion dollars and in 1985, 14 countries rescheduled 51 billion
dollars. From 1980 -1982,there were an average of six reschedulings peryear. See Watson
et al (1986), Tables 36, 37 and 38.
2 See "Latin American Loans:Selling Them for All They're Worth," in the Economist,
March 2, 1985, "U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt," in the New YorkTimes, September 11,
1986 and "Growing Market in Third World Debt Raises Questions on the Loans'Value,"
in the Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1986. According to the Wall Street Journalreport, estimates of the market for 1986 are on the order of four hundred million dollarsper month.
That article cites lists published by Salamon Brothers and Merrill Lynchas the source for
the following table of offer prices (cents per dollar of directgovernment loans): Argentina,
67; Brazil,76; Chile, 69; Ecuador, 66; Mexico, 62; Nigeria, 60; Peru, 24; Phillipines,62;
Poland, 53; and Venezuela, 77. Bid prices are two to five cents below offer prices.
See Kyle and Sachs (1984). 'SeeWorld Bank Debt Tables.
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) provide an overview of the literature. See also the
other articles in the June 1986 edition of the European Economic Review,as well as the
papers in Cuddington and Smith (1985).
1experience of the past decade strongly suggests that reschedulings are negotiated partial
defaults; countries can and do bargain down their repayments without necessarily refusing
to pay entirely. Moreover, rescheduling appears to be a process of constant rebargaining
rather than a one-time partial repudiation of debt.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple but more realistic model of sovereign
default, one which explains negotiated partial defaults and repeated reschedulings.6 Ac-
cording to our model, if banks thought that the increased integration of trade alter World
War II would make complete default prohibitively costly for an LDC, they might well have
been right. If debtor countries had to choose between paying off their debts and facing trade
and financial autarky, they might well choose to pay off their loans on a timely basis. But
unfortunately (cx post) for the banks, they cannot restrict a debtor country to these two
options by making "take it or leave it" offers. When the country is more realistically treated
as being able to make counteroffers, the banks cannot always credibly refuse to bargain.
The maximum level of borrowing a debtor country can undertake (henceforth we refer
to the LDC borrower as the "country") depends on the probability distribution of its output,
its terms of trade, and world interest rates. Unanticipated movements in these variables
can lead to reschedulings and, because partial default is possible, the level of repayments is
continuous in the realizations of the disturbances.7 One interesting prediction of the model
is that an unanticipated rise in world interest rates can actually reduce a country's repay-
ments to the banks. Higher world interest rates hurt banks' bargaining position since they
become more anxious to get their money out of the LDC and into high yielding investments
elsewhere. A debtor country can exploit this impatience in rescheduling negotiations.
Our bargaining approach extends naturally to exploring the role of Western govern-
ments (henceforth the "U.S.") in the rescheduling process. A key point here is that the
U.S. may be better off if it can precommit not to participate in rescheduling negotiations,
even if U.S. consumers have a significant vested interest in keeping up the level of trade,
6Theclosest antecedent to our paper would appear to be Ozler (1984). Ozler recognizes
that bargaining may occur in place of repudiation, because bargaining leads to more efficient
outcomes. Her model, however, does not incorporate a strategic model of the bargaining
process.
The fact that in our model repayments are continuous in the disturbances would seem
to make it more directly applicable to time series data than "all or nothing" default models.
2and even if the loans have already been made.8 Unfortunately, in a perfectequilibrium,
the U.S. may not be able to avoid making sidepayments. The banks and thecountry can
exploit its impatience for trade to resume.
In Section II we develop the basic model, in which the only collateral forsovereign
lending is the country's gains from trade. In Section III, we derive the equilibrium lending
contract, and show that it must be enforceable as a bargaining equilibrium at each instant
in time. Even if one increased banks' power to punish the country in the event ofdefault,
banks still might not be able to collect higher repayments when there isbargaining. The
model of Sections II and Ill is nonstochastic, so there are never actuallyany defaults, partial
or otherwise. In Section IV, we allow for uncertainty in output and world interest rates.
It is in this section that we show why an unanticipated rise in world interest ratesmay
actually make the debtor country better off. Even with uncertainty, there still needn't be
any formal reschedulings if the explicit legal contract between the banks and the country
is fully state contingent and can be supported at all times as a bargainingequilibrium.
However, at the end of Section IV, we discuss reasons why the legal contract might differ
from the implicit contract, and hence why the need for reschedulingscan arise. In Section
V, we introduce the U.S. into the analysis, and in Section VI we indicate how to interpret
our results when either the banks and/or the country's political parties do not act as a single
monolithic bargainers. In the conclusions, we discuss some of the empirical observations
which motivated our choice of modeling strategies. One issue is whethera country's main
incentive to repay its debts is to protect its rights to trade freely, or whether it is the desire
to have the option of borrowing again in the future.
II. Tastes, Technology, and the Legal Environment
We begin by stating the optimization problem of the country. To do so requiressped-
lying the country's objective function, describing its production technology, its trading and
borrowing possibilities, and the legal environment in which it operates. Later in this section,
we will describe the optimization problem of the banks in an analogous fashion.
8 Earlier authors have suggested that the U.S.may be forced to "bail out" the banks
because of commitments through Federal Deposit Insurance [see Folkerts—Landau (1985)J.
In our model, the U.S. is concerned with gains from trade.
3The country is governed by leaders who seek to maximize the objective function
=>(C÷hj+ Cfh)/(1 + 5h),0 < 5,
where CD and CF are domestic consumption of good D and good F respectively, h is
the length of a time period, and Sh is the leaders' rate of time preference (per period).9
Throughout most of our discussion, there will be no presumption that the country's leaders'
preferences coincide with those of its citizens. In fact, we will assume that the leaders'
objective function discounts the future at a rate above the world interest rate, regardless of
investment opportunities and consumer preferences. The rationale is that the leaders are
uncertain about the length of their tenure in office, or alternatively, their life expectancy.
Production is exogenous. Each period the country produces h units of good D. This
output can be consumed domestically, stored (in storage the good shrinks by 100'yh percent
per period), or traded internationally in exchange for good F. If traded, each unit of good D
fetches P units of good F, F> 1. Since the two goods are perfect substitutes in the leaders'
utility function, it is clear that with free trade, all production of D will be exchanged for
units ofF.
The country's ability to trade freely is compromised whenever it is in default on its
foreign debt. Although foreign creditors have no means to seize assets within the country
itself, their claims do have standing in U.S. courts. This makes the country's ships, goods
in transit, and asset holdings subject to seizure in U.S. territory. Creditor banks can also
interfere with the country's access to trade credits, and this interference will make it quite
difficult for the country to conduct non-barter trade. We are implicitly assuming that when
a country borrows money it will sign a contract, valid in U.S. courts, which grants creditor
banks these rights of seizure. Later, in Section IV, we discuss why it will always be in the
interests of the country to sign such a contract.
We model the seizure technology by assuming that whenever the country trades while
in default, the banks are able to seize up to 100/3percentof the goods in transit, 0 < /3 < 1.
Since the banks may incur costs of seizure, their net benefit is only a fraction a, 0 < a < /3,
By restricting our attention to the case where the country's leaders are risk neutral,
we are able to simplify our analysis of rescheduling agreements considerably.
4of the quantity of the country's trade subjected to seizure.10 The country's optimization
problem (sans perfection constraints) is thus given by:




(4) Si Cg0,Cr￿ 0, T h + S,
where S is the beginning-of- period-t stock of good D, T is the quantity of good D exported
in period t, and R represents payments by the country to foreign banks (in units of good
F). X E [0, 1] is the percent of the country's shipments which the banks attempt to
seize. When the country is in technical default, X is a choice variable of the banks. The
country is also subject to two other types of constraints. First, the country must provide the
banks with at least zero economic profits, a condition we will make precise after formalizing
the banks' optimization problem. Second, because of the country's inability to commit to
future repayments, it faces certain perfection constraints on its actions. The mathematical
implications of these constraints will be analyzed in section III.
To rule out supergame (reputational) equilibria in the later analysis, we assume that
the country can only produce good D until some known future date t, after which its
output is limited to h units of good F per period; rcanbe arbitrarily large.
We now turn to the optimization problem of the banks. The country can borrow abroad
from competitive, risk—neutral banking consortiums. However, no consortium will lend the
country funds at the world interest rate unless the loan contract includes a clause (which
as always, will be enforceable only in U.S. courts), which gives the consortium seniority
10 Obviously, in a more general setting the country will redirect trade and investment so
as to minimize its losses from seizure. The operative assumption here is that the country
would be better off if it did not have to take such measures.
5over future lenders. A sufficiently strong clause would be one which says that the country
cannot borrow elsewhere beyond a pre-specified limit without permission of all its creditors;
abrogation of this clause causes the consortium's debt to be due and payable immediately.
The contract also must assign the consortium a senior claim over later creditors in dividing
up any seizures; this clause insures that the initial consortium will have enough bargaining
power to obtain at least as high a rate of return as any future lenders brought in by the
country in violation of its borrowing—limit clause. However, the contract will not give the
banks in the initial consortium any ex post monopoly power over the country as long as the
country is always allowed to repay its outstanding loans by replacing them with loans from
a new competitive consortium.
We assume that with the help of cross-default clauses, each banking group is able to
negotiate with the country as a unified entity. In Section VI, we relax this assumption and
show that it is not essential for the results below.
The world one-period interest rate is r3h in period s. In the nonstochastic model of
the next two sections r, =r,a constant. A bank consortium will only agree to make a loan
with repayment schedule {R) if
(5) max(Rt+hi + aTt+h1Xt+h1)/(1 + rh)' ￿ 0,
where the repayment R is negative in periods when the banks are giving cash to the country.
X represents the percent of the country's shipments which the banks subject to seizure.
If the country is not in arrears, then X is legally constrained to zero. lithe country is in
default on its debt, banks can legally subject up to 100 percent of the country's shipments
to seizure (X =1),unless setting X at a lower level is sufficient to cover the country's
obligations. Because the seizure technology exhibits constant returns to scale, the banks
will always set X at its legal maximum in any given period, in which case they recoup XoT.
Basically, we need covenants enforceable in U.S. courts that prevent the country and a
second group of banks from being able to jointly game the initial consortium. The country
will not be able to induce a second bank consortium to come in unless the second consortium
expects to get at least a market return. As long as the initial consortium's bond covenents
are strong enough to give it seniority in any default proceedings, the new lenders will
be unable to make a sufficient rate of return unless the old lenders are paid the market
rate. See Brau and Williams (1983) for a further discussion of interlender equity issues in
rescheduling.
6Note that the banks' threat to harass the country's trade if it defaults is credible; they gain
positive profits and do not sacrifice future negotiating leverage. We are now ready to solve
for the equilibrium in our model.
III. The Equilibrium Loan Contract
If the country's leaders could maximize (1) subject only to (2)-(5) and an integral
budget constraint, they would arrange to borrow the entire present value of future output
for immediate consumption so long as 6>r.12However, the banks wifi not be willing to
lend the country more than it can be forced to repay. The only credible threat that the
banks have against the country is to harass its trade and therefore, loans will be limited by
the effectiveness of this threat.
it is useful to proceed by asking how much creditor banks can collect if the country
owes them an infinite amount of debt. La this case the country will never be able to trade
freely without a rescheduling agreement with the banks. Obviously the country will never
pay more for a rescheduling agreement than it would lose through seizure. However, even
if the country owes banks an ininite amount, they may not be able to get all the country's
gains from trading. Through bargaining, the country may be able to force the banks to
settle for lower payments.
If bargaining is limited to the banks' making take-it-or-leave-it offers to the country
over repayments, then the banks can indeed extract the full amount of the country's costs
of seizure. This is easily shown to be true even though the country has the ability to refuse
such an offer and store any output of good Dforfuture sale or consumption. if, however,
rescheduling negotiations are more realistically viewed as bilateral, repayments can be less.
Following R.ubinstein (1982), we will employ an alternating offers model of bargaining as a
way of modeling negotiations.13
12 in a more general setting in which the country's leaders are riskaverse, they will want
to borrow enough to equate the ratio of present discounted marginal utilities of consumption
between any two periods with the world interest rate. If, however, their ability to commit
to repayments is limited, they may have to shift consumption into future periods; see for
example, Sacks (1984). This case is in most respects qualitatively equivalent to the model
of the text. The most significant difference is that in the risk—averse case, the country might
take time to run up its debt instead of doing it all at once.
13 The problem here differs in some respects from R.ubinstein's. In this model, the players
are engaged in repeated bargaining over a sequence of goods, each of which produce a one—
7Before further characterizing the bargaining process, it is useful to note two special
features of our model. First, it is never efficient to have the country pay out more than is
necessary to clear the way for trading current output (and any cumulated stock). In par-
ticular, the country will not pay the banks a lump-sum amount in exchange for contractual
permission to trade freely for longer than just the current period. Such a payment is never
part of an equilibrium bargain, because it is inefficient for the high discount rate country
to make advance payments to the low discount rate banks. Second, we can think of the
banks and the country as bargaining separately over each unit of output. Because both
sides are risk neutral, the gains from trade will be split in the same proportion regardless
of the level of inventory held by the country (that is, regardless of the quantity of output
being bargained over).14
To close the model, it is still necessary to specify the exact nature of the bargaining
process. We will assume that the country and the banks take turns making offers with
respect to the output produced in a given period. The length of time between offers is the
same as the length of time between periods, h. The banks always get to make the first offer,
though this advantage is of little consequence if the length of time between periods is very
small, as we shall assume.
Our notation for describing the bargaining process is as follows: If the output being
negotiated was produced in period t, then the banks' offer in period i+s is characterized by
q(t, s), where q is the fraction of remaining output (initial period t output less depreciation)
going to the banks and 1— q is the fraction that goes to the country. When it is the country's
turn to make an offer, it proposes a division q'(t, s),wherebythe banks get q' of output,
and the country gets 1 —q'.When a rescheduling agreement is reached, the banks receive
a payment from the country and in return contract to not interfere in the trade of goods
time benefit to the consumer. Itubinstein analyzes a bargain over a good that produces a
flow of services to its owner. While in the flow model the current owner of a good is able
to enjoy services in any interval prior to sale, in the stock model the owner's bargaining
power may be diminished by his inability to do any consuming prior to concluding a trade
agreement.
14 With varying risk tolerances the problem becomes more complex, because the more risk
averse party (technically, the party with the lower ratio of marginal utility of income to the
average marginal utility of income over the amount of income attained in the equilibrium
bargain) will be at a disadvantage in bargaining over relatively large amounts. For more on
bargaining under risk aversion, see Roth (1984).
8produced in period t.
We will impose that the equilibrium be a perfect equilibrium. Roughlyspeaking, in
a perfect equilibrium neither side can influence the bargaining by trying to make a threat
(such as "take this offer or I'll walk") which it would not carry out if calledupon to do
so. Formally, in every subgame of a perfect equilibrium, the strategies used by each of the
players must form a Nash equffibrium. In a perfect equilibrium, either party (i.e., the bank
or the country) will agree to a rescheduling proposal if the proposal offers the party at least
as much in discounted present value as it can hope to obtain by waiting, given the strategies
of both the banks and the country. In equilibrium, the following conditions will have to
hold Vs ￿ t,s —teven:15
(6) (1 —q(t,s)) =max[(l
—q'(i,s + 1)) ,lIP,(1 —fi)],
(7) q'(t,s + 1) =q(t,s+ 2)
Equation(6) states that for the bank's offer in period s to be acceptable to the country,
it must give the country as much (in discounted utility terms) as the maximum of what
the country could get if it (a) turned down the offer and made a minimum acceptable
counteroffer in the next period; (b) simply consumed the output domestically; or (c) shipped
the goods without a rescheduling agreement and suffered the attendant losses through
seizure. Equation (7) states that if the country makes an offer in period s + 1, it must offer
the bank as much (in present value) as the bank would get if it turned down the country's
offer and made a minimum acceptable counteroffer in the next period.
The logic underlying equations (6) and (7) is that if it is either party's turn to make an
offer, it will offer the minimum acceptable to the other party. The other party will accept
any offer that makes it better off than in the subgame where it refuses that offer; thus the
minimum acceptable offer is the one that gives the other party exactly as much utility as
it would get in the subgame where it rejected the offer. Clearly, the offerer will do better 'Bywriting each side's offer only as a function of time, we have implicitly ruled out
history—dependent strategies. Rubinstein (1982) has shown that in this two—player bar-
gaining framework, history—dependent strategies cannot be equilibrium and indeed, there
is a unique perfect equilibrium. For a very simple proof of Rubinstein's results, see Shaked
and Sutton (1984). Their proof can be applied directly to the present problem.
9by offering this minimum rather than having an offer rejected. For then the other party
will end up getting the same utility, and since the gains from trade will be realized a period
later, the offerer will be worse off. Of course, there is no point in making more than the
minimum acceptable offer.
The unique equilibrium rescheduling agreement is given by the stationary equilibrium
of the system of difference equations governed by (6) and (7) [It is a simple matter to
show that any path which obeys (6) and (7), and does not initiate at the unique stationary
equilibrium, wifi violate the boundary condition that neither side's share can exceed one.]:
(h(7+S)(1+hr) P—i
(8)
Note that the parties always reach an agreement without delay. The bargaining always
produces an efficient outcome. In the limit as h —+0+(continuous bargaining), (8) becomes
17+5P—i
P
Equation (9) indicates that the equilibrium rescheduling agreement will fall into one of
three regions, depending on which of the three right-hand side terms in (9) is the minimum.
We call these the bargaining region, the autarky-constrained region, and the punishment-
constrained region respectively. Note that the three RHS terms in (9) each depend on
entirely different parameters, and are monotonic in all their arguments. Therefore, varying
any one parameter of the model will only affect the value of one term and will not affect
the relative ranking of the other two regions.
In the bargaining region, the bank gets P(7 + 5)/(27 + 5 + r), and the country gets
P(7 + r)/(27 + 5 + r). A crucial feature here is that the banks' receipts are linear in
the world market value of the country's production of tradeables, not just the gains from
trade (P —i).The reason that the bank can effectively bargain over the gross value
of tradeables and not just the country's gains from trade, is that the country's threat to
either consume the goods or ship them without a rescheduling agreement is not perfect,
and therefore irrelevant. That is, for example, the country cannot present the bank with
a rescheduling offer and tell the banks that if this offer is not accepted, the country will
consume the goods. The reason is that if the banks refuse the offer, the country will not
make good on its threat since it will be better off if it continues to bargain. Thus, the fact
iothat these goods have some value to the country in domesticconsumption does not affect
the equilibrium.
The relative shares of the two parties in the bargaining region are in inverseproportion
to their rate of impatience in reaching a settlement, + 6 for thecountry and y + rfor
the banks. Note that the rate of impatience for each side is determined notjust by their
respective rates of time preference, but also by the rate at which the good deteriorates in
storage, 7. If y is large, as with nondurable exports, then the shares in the bargaining
region are roughly equal. Note that the assumption of storeability does notprevent us
from applying our paradigm to a country which exports bananas. Think of thecountry
as holding the bananas in port, awaiting a rescheduling agreement. As long as a series of
counteroffers can be exchanged in the time it takes for the bananas torot, the banks cannot
simply make take it or leave it offers.
The higher the world interest rate, r,theless a country (which owes an infinite amount)
will have to pay. When world interest rates rise, the banks becomemore impatient to get
theirmoneyout of the country, and into high-yielding investments elsewhere. Thecountry
can exploit this impatience to its advantage.16 This logic underlies our result in section IV
that an unanticipated rise in world interest rates can actually favor the debtorcountry. In
the non-stochastic model of this section, however, higher world interest rates willalways
make the country worse off because they are perfectly anticipated. We shallexpand on this
point shortly and then again in section IV.
When the gains from trade are small [P <(2' +6 + r)/(7+r)Jandthe potential costs
of seizure are relatively high (1/P> 1 —fi), thenthe country's threat to consume in the
absence of a bargaining agreement becomes credible. In this autarky region, thepayments
to the banks prescribed in the bargaining region exceed the total gains from trade. However,
an agreement is always reached because the banks wifi find it in their interest to make an
offer allowing the country to trade for a payment just infinitesimally smaller than the total
gains from trade. Within the autarky region, the level of repayments is extremely sensitive
to the world market price of the country's output, P. While in the other regions, a fall in
P affects the banks and the country proportionately, in the autarky—constrained regionany
16Giventhat 6> r if the spread between the two is a constant, a rise in both rates still
hurts the banks' bargaining position.
11drop in the relative price of exports causes a loss borne solely by the banks.
11/3 is the minimum argument on the right-hand side of (9), the country's threat to
trade without an agreement is credible. The punishment-constrained region is the relevant
one whenever the banks have very little ability to impose damage on the country's trade.
Interestingly, in the punishment-constrained region, the bargaining equilibrium is the same
as the equilibrium when banks can make take-it-or-leave-it offers.'7 The model thus provides
a rationalization for the equilibrium discussed in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Sachs (1984),
Folkerts-Landau (1985), and others. In the punishment-constrained region, the bank gets
/3P and the country does not have any way to negotiate a lower payment. It cannot
credibly commit to refusing an offer which gives it infinitesimally more than (1 —
theamount it would get from shipping without a rescheduling agreement. The reason is
that such an offer is already as good as the country can hope to get through continued
bargaining. The key to this result is that bargaining enables the bank to negotiate over the
country's entire production of tradeables, and not just the amount of damage the banks
could impose on the country, /3g.
Whilethe banks' ability to inflict damage on the country through seizure sets a limit
on its repayments, the ability to increase seizures does nothing for the banks outside of the
punishment—constrained region. An increase in /3hasno effect on debt payments in the
bargaining region. It also would not help the banks to be able to reduce the deadweight
loss involved in the seizure technology. So long as the banks get any positive net revenues
from seizure, i.e. a >0,it is completely credible for the banks to threaten maximal seizure
activities if the country tries to ship without a rescheduling agreement. On the other hand, if
the equilibrium is in the bargaining region, it does not matter if aPj ￿ P(7+ö)/(27+ö+r),
in which case banks obtain less through bargaining than they would if the country traded
without a rescheduling agreement. The banks' difficulty is that they cannot initiate seizures
until the country initiates trade; this is why the size of a does not matter.18
The maximum amount the country can borrow is calculated by taking the present value
17 Obviously, this is also the case in the autarky region.
If a <0,then the banks' threat to seize shipments is not credible and they won't be
paid a peso in a perfect equilibrium. In this case, one would need to appeal to a reputational
supergame argument to rationalize any equilibrium in which repayments (and also loans) are
made. It seems quite plausible to assume a >0at some level of seizure activity whenever
the country trades at the efficient level (T =
12of the maximum repayments it would make if it had a (nominally) infiniteliability. Such
a loan would give the banks annual payments equal to what is prescribed by (8) or (when
h is small) by (9), discounted by the interest rate r. Thus, the maximum loan whenh is
small approaches:'9
(10) =(?)mim(27r' /3)
Note that a higher value of r can reduce the maximum loan in twoways. First, a higher
discount rate makes the present value of any given stream ofrepayments less valuable to the
bank. Second, if equilibrium is in the bargaining region, an increase in the discountrate of
the banks makes them worse bargainers and thus decreases the level ofpayments in every
period. Since we have assumed that banks are competitive and earn zero profits on their
initial loans, both factors will necessarily imply a loss of utility to the country's leaders.2°
Of course, we have been assuming that the country's output is notgrowing. If its output
grows at rate g, then the term Pi/r in (10) becomes P/(r —g).2'If the country's growth
rate exceeds the relevant interest rate, the country can borrow as much as it wants. The
growth rate statistics in the Appendix suggest that there is a significant chance thatg will
be less than r (on average) into the forseeable future formany major debtors.
IV. Stochastic Output and Interest Rates
In the absence of uncertainty, rational banks will never lend thecountry more than it
can be bargained into repaying.22 This is not necessarily the case once we alk,w for uncer-
tainty in the country's output, the terms of trade, or world interest rates. With uncertainty,
19 In (10) and in theremaining formulas in the paper, we have taken the limiting expres-
sion as —+oo.
20 After a consortium makesan initial loan to the country of size ,noother lender will
ever enter. Our assumptions concerning legal rights insure that the initial lenders wifi get
at least as high a rate of return as any future lenders. Once the country has borrowed to
the hilt, any new loans will not increase total repayments. Hence, additionallending would
make lenders as a class, and new lenders in particular, losers.
21 One possible extension of the model would beto introduce investment along the lines
of Cohen and Sachs (1986), and Sachs (1984). 11 the country can precommit to investsome
part of its share of the gains from trade, creditor banks will accept lower current repayments.
When the country invests, its future path of output rises, and the banks know they wifi be
able to collect more later on.
22 Anticipated defaults can occur in the model of sectionV, in which the U.S. is coerced
into making a fraction of the country's payments.
13the maximum amount the country will pay each period fluctuates.23 Most of this section
will be devoted to determining what the implicit contract between the country and the
banks must be. Although payments fluctuate, there is never any need to formally recon-
tract, so long as the explicit legal contract is fully state contingent and corresponds exactly
to the implicit contract which can be supported as a bargaining equilibrium. Towards the
end of this section, we discuss reasons why reschedulings may sometimes be needed.
The maximum amount the country can borrow, ,obviouslydepends on the probability
distribution of the maximum payments the country will pay. The simplest case is when
output is stochastic, since repayments are linear in output, and since the level of output has
no effect on the banks' share. If output is distributed with probability density 1(y) along
the interval [ymin, ymax], then the country's collateral is given by:
too
(11) =qPJ e'8 jyf(y)dyds,
0
or equivalently
(12) = qP je"E(y8)ds
where E(y3) is the expected value of period s output, conditional on time zero information.
Because 5 >r,the country will clearly borrowimmediately in return for incurring
obligations that will lead to the same stream of repayments as infinite debt.
Stochastic interest rates present slightly more technical problems, since our analysis of
bargaining imposed constant interest rates. Whereas it is feasible to extend oitr bargaining
model to allow for fairly general stochastic processes for interest rates, we shall only analyze
a special simple case, one which nevertheless allows us to bring out some important points.
We shall assume that there will be a one-time permanent change in the world interest
rate, occuring at some random time twiththe density function Ae for 0 ￿ Aoc.
When the shock occurs, the post—shock interest rate wifi be ,wherei is distributed with
probability density g() along the positive interval [7mhz, ,.m&X], rm <5.In this case,
the collateral the country has to offer can be thought of as the sum of two claims, one of
which pays 4Pi in all periods after the shock (where the banks' shareis a function of
23 Risk sharing is not an issue here, since both the country and the banks are risk neutral.
It is the fact that 5 >rwhich creates a role for international lending.
14the realization of i) and one of which pays a fixed amount qP in all periods priortothe
shock.
The value of the claim which only requires payments in the post-shock period is:
(13) =P fAe(A)tE(/i)dt =PAE(/)/(r +A).
Thatis, after the shock the banks get a perpetuity with payments at rate discounted
forever at rate i. The likelihood that the perpetuity will begin in year t is Ae_t, and the
present discounted value of a dollar in year t is et. Similarly, the value of the loan on
which payments are received only before the shock is
(14) Pf)J e_+?)tqdt =Pq/(r+ A).
Themaximum amount the country can borrow, 3,isfound by adding (13) and (14).24
An increased probabifity of high interest rates unambiguously lowers the amount the
country can borrow. Suppose one distribution of post-shock interest rates, A, is created
from another distribution, B, by shifting probability mass from the low tail of B to the
high tail. Then the country can borrow more if interest rates are governed by distribution
B. A higher distribution of interest rates implies that future payments are discounted more
heavily. Also, a higher post-shock interest rate never raises the country's payments qp,
and will lower them if equilibrium is in the bargaining region. The result here that an
increased probability of high interest rates is bad for the country is the stochastic analogue
of our result in section III concerning a fully anticipated increase in world interest rates.
However, although anticipated interest rate increases are bad for the country, it may benefit
by an unanticipated interest rate increase. It is a simple matter to show that this is the
case once the country is "loaned up"; that is, when it has already committed to a stream of
repayments greater than it can be forced to repay. An unanticipated interest rate increase
will then either reduce or leave unchanged the payments the country will have to make. This
result holds even if the interest rate the country is supposed to pay is notninaily "indexed"
In general q does not equal,thelevel of payments the country could be forced to
make if no shock were ever anticipated. That is because the bargaining over each unit is
affected by the possibility that the banks' opportunity cost of waiting may change at some
point. However, our bargaining model can stifi be solved when uncertainty about interest
rates follows a Poisson process, and it is a simple matter to derive q =(5+2AE())/(S +
2A + r), (as h —*0+).Hence if E( =), thenpayments in the preshock period will be .
15to the world interest rate. Thus the fact that there are more defaults when interest rates
rise may not simply be a result of debtor countries' inability to handle the excess debt
burden. It can also be due to the way in which high world interest rates improve a debtor's
bargaining position. Payments can actually go down.
To be concrete, suppose that country M initially has debts with a face value of 100
billion dollars. Assume that inflation is two percent, that interest rates are seven percent,
and that the country is making payments of five billion dollars per year. Hence the nominal
value of its debt is rising by two percent per year, and the real value is constant. Our model
suggests the possibility that when interest rates rise to ten percent (with inflation remaining
at two percent), M's payments might actually fall to four billion dollars (perhaps with the
face value of this loaned-up country's debt being increased nominally and meaninglessly
by six billion dollars.) Obviously, there are many qualifications to the above result. An
unanticipated interest rate increase is not necessarily good for the country before it is
"loaned up".
Finally, we come to the question of how optimal sovereign lending contracts should be
written. The issue is how to make best use of the country's only vehicle for legal precom-
mitment, the U.S. courts. We wifi assume that the country's discount rate is higher than
the world interest rate in all states, so that the country would like to borrow the maximum
possible amount. The optimal legal contract is one which gives the banks enough bargaining
power to assure ex ante that they will be able to collect the maximum possible amount in afl
states of nature. Whereas such a contract implicitly gives the banks a contingent claim on
the country's production, there are at least two (closely related) reasons (within the scope
of the model), why it will be in the interests of the parties to formally label the country's
obligations "debt". First, suppose instead that the banks are given equity in the country's
export industries. Then if the country later adopts a policy interfering with repatriation
of dividends, or if it taxes exports, the banks' share is reduced and they do not have the
same legal recourse given to them by a loan default. Second, and perhaps more relevant
to the case of productivity uncertainty, the variables which determine repayments may be
observable, but not verifiable. That is, although both parties may have equal knowledge
about developments in the country's productive capacity, it may be difficult to develop
evidence which will stand up in U.S. courts. Most debtor countries do not publish national
16GNP accounts and, even if they did, these could be distorted in a way which be difficult to
document. Therefore, it may be imp ossible to write enforceable contracts which are explic-
itly contingent on the key repayment variables. Hence, there may sometimes be a need to
write rescheduling agreements.
From the above discussion, we can see why the optimal legal contract might involve
having the face value of the debt will be set so high that the country will partially default
in all but the most favorable states of nature (unless, of course, shocks are verifiable). As
a detail, we might mention that it is irrelevant how the discrepancy between the market
value and the face value of the original loan is created. Debt can be sold at an original issue
discount, or the banks can impose large service fees on the country, so that the amount of
money given the country is less than the face amount of the loan.
One further reason why the explicit contract between the banks and the countrymay
deviate from the implicit contract has to do with sidepayments from the U.S., an issue we'll
consider next. Since it's not possible to write these sidepayments into the contract, itmay
be necessary to have actual rescheduling negotiations in order to get the U.S. to kick in its
share.
V. U.S. Government Intervention
Until now, our model has not allowed for any possible U.S. government (U.S.) involve-
ment in the rescheduling process.25 In this section, we consider what role the U.S. might
be willing (or forced) to play if it is concerned about maintaining its gains from trade.
Whenever a country repudiates its debt and the banks begin seizure activities, then the
consequent reduction in trade adversely affects U.S. consumers and producers.
One can certainly think of other reasons why the U.S. might be drawn into the ne-
gotiations. The most often cited reasons are fear of a banking crisis and Federal deposit
insurance. It should be possible to extend the model developed below to incorporate these
factors, but it is not certain how important they are either from a normative or a positive
Except, of course, that the U.S. legal system plays a crucial role in the analysis of
sections III and IV. In this section, we treat the U.S. legal system as constitutionally im-
mutable, and therefore not subject to manipulation by the congressional or executive branch
which we refer to as the U.S. government. The executive branch may have some control
over intensity of enforcement; here it will always choose the minimum possible level. We
intend to examine this issue in more detail in future research.
17point of view. Whereas the equity of U.S. banks may not be sufficient to absorb a total
repudiation of all their holdings of LDC debt, the banks have built up their capital in recent
years26, and can now absorb a large writedown on LDC debt. (The secondary market trans-
actions cited in footnote 2 provide only a partial guide for determining the true value of the
loans. The problem is that these prices may already reflect anticipated U.S. government
assistance.) And even if some bankrupt banks do have to be reorganized, these can proba-
bly be absorbed into the banking system without any great loss of financial intermediation
services. A significant advantage to the gains from trade rationale over the FDIC/banking
crisis rationale, is that the former simultaneously explains banks' bargaining power. The
desire to preserve gains from trade explains why the U.S. can't force bank stockholders to
absorb most or all the losses. It also explains why banks from other Western countries also
have some leverage with the U.S.. Banks have bargaining power because of their legal rights
to interfere with trade if the country defaults on its debt.
A central conclusion of our analysis is that even if the gains from trade are important
to the U.S., the U.S. will generally be better off it it can precommit to stay out of the
rescheduling process. And although it would be better to make this precommitment before
the loans are made, it is still the best policy even in the event of a default crisis. The
point is that the banks and the country will always arrive at an efficient bargain, and this
means there will be no interruption of trade. It is not necessary for the U.S. to kick in
sidepayments to ensure an outcome which is already in the banks' and the country's best
interests. Unfortunately for the U.S. —andthis is the other main point of the section —
itmay have no way to credibly commit not to bargain. The banks and the country can
exploit the U.S.'s desire to enjoy its gains from trade sooner rather than later. In a perfect
equilibrium, the U.S. can be bargained into making sidepayments.
At this point, we are forced to make a slight digression to derive the U.S.'s objective
function. Obviously, it is possible to motivate the U.S.'s gains from trade by positing that
the country is the sole supplier of a strategic resource, or that it is a large trading partner.
But in the interests of maintaining internal consistency with the model of sections II—IV,
26 In June 1982, the ratio of U.S. bank capital to developing countries loans was 50
percent. By June 1985, this ratio had risen to 71 percent. For the largest nine banks, the
ratios are lower but the trend is the same. Their capital/developing country loan ratio was
forty percent at the end of 1984. See Watson et aJ (1986), Table 34 and chart 10.
18we seek a rationale consistent with the country being small and a price-taker in world
markets. How is it possible that a small price-taking country can have bargaining power?27
One answer is as follows: Suppose that the U.S. and the country are the world'sonly
potential consumers of good D, the good produced and exported by the country. The U.S.
imports good D from a large number of competitive suppilers abroad, but there are no U.S.
producers. All the foreign producers, except the country, have inelastic supplycurves; their
total supply is ( —i.Moreover, there are no storeage facilities in the U.S. so that once
good D is shipped to the U.S., it must be consumed immediately (once picked, the produce
rip ens quickly).
Let V(Q) denote total U.S. consumer surplus, and let U(Q) denote the utility of the
marginal U.S. consumer when total consumption is Q.Thenif the total supply to the U.S.
is ,consumersurplus is given by
fQ
(15) V(Q)=J U(Q)dQ—QU(Q), 0
where we have made use of the market equilibrium condition P =U(().A small reduction
in the amount of good D shipped to the U.S. leads to a loss of consumer surplus givenby
(16) = = zU(Q),
where z =—(OU/OQ)(Q/U)is the inverse of the elasticity of demand for good D. Hence
if the country is small, the U.S. will lose zP in current consumer surplusper period if the
country's goods are permanently withheld from the U.S. market.28 We have assumed that
the supply functions of the other foreign producers are inelastic. If they are elastic, then
the U.S. would get less consumer surplus from trading with the country; if perfectly elastic,
then the U.S. gets no benefit.
Note that the country would have no way to exploit its bargaining power were it not for
the existence of the U.S. government. It is only through the government that thecountry
27 Dixit (1986) discusses a number ofreasons why smallness may not be a handicap in
strategic trade negotiations. To our knowledge, however, the approach adopted here is
novel.
28 We shall assume that the maximum amount ofgood D the country can put on the
U.S. market (from production and out of storage) is sufficiently small so that the marginal
gains from trade for the U.S. are approximately constant. (Sufficient conditions include a
high depreciation rate, y, or a short time horizon, t*.)
19can bargain with U.S. consumers. A second essential factor is the assumption that good D
is not produced in the U.S.. Consider the other extreme where all production (except the
country's) is based in the U.S.. Then, although a suspension of trade with the country still
implies a loss of surplus for U.S. consumers, this loss is (approximately) cancelled out by a
gain in producers' surplus.
From (16), it is apparent that the country's bargaining power is only of the same order
of magnitude as its output and debt repayments. Hence if the country produces two dollars
of output (per period), its bargaining power will be on the order of one dollar, and not one
hundred million dollars. Note that the country's debt repayments wifi also be of the same
order of magnitude as its output.
We will assume that the U.S. government seeks to maximize the presented discounted




where B represent sidepayments by the U.S. to the banks and/or country. In (17), we have
assumed that the U.S. government discounts future costs and benefits at the world interest
r; this assumption seems natural but does not qualitatively affect our results.
Having discussed the U.S.'s interest in the negotiations between the country and the
banks, we are now ready to be more specific about the three—way bargaining process. Any
rescheduling contract must be signed by both the banks and the country. The U.S.'s consent
is not required unless the agreement calls for the U.S. to make positive sidepayments. If the
banks and/or the country choose to bring the U.S. into the bargaining, each of the three
parties will take turns making offers. It will be convenient to restrict our attention to the
case where 1/P > 1 —/3, sothat the relevant threatpoint for the country is autarky. (We
shall also assume that 8> (7+ 6)/(37 +26+ r); this assumption wifi turn out to preclude
any threat by the U.S and the country to deal out the banks.) Then the total surplus to
29 II bank profits are taxed, the U.S. government also benefits from any payments the
country makes to the banks. It is straightforward to show that the qualitative effect of
introducing this consideration is to raise the sidepayments the U.S. can be bargained into
making. It is perhaps simplest for purposes of this section to assume that the country's
creditor banks are located in other Western countries, ones which do not produce or consume
good D. This also helps justify the simplifying assumption that the banks' stockholders do
not enter into the U.S.'s utility function.
20be divided up among the three parties is the sum of the U.S.'s gains from trade, zP, and
the country's gains from trade, (P —1);if an agreement is not reached immediately, then
of course these amounts decline at rate (1 —-yh)as the good depreciates. For notational
purposes, it will be convenient to specify each party's offer in terms of shares of (1 + z)P.
Thus when it is the banks' turn to make an offer, it offers the country 100(1 —q—to)percent
of remaining (1 + z)P, and the U.S. 100wpercent.The country's offer to the banks is q',
and to the U.S., vi. The U.S.'s offers are q" to the banks and 1 —q"
—to" tothe country.
Following the same steps as in Section III, one can show that in any perfect equilibrium
with history—independent strategies, the following conditions must hold Vs ￿ t, where s —t
isa multiple of three:3°
(18a) [1 —q(t,s)
—to(t,s)J=max{[i —q'(t,s+ 1)— w'(t,s+1)]2)'(1+z)P}
I, f1—1h\z 1
(18b) w(t8)=mrn1.tu(i,s+1)(\lh),j,
(18c) q'(t,s + 1) =q"(t,s+ 2) (
(18d) w'(t,s+1) =min [w"(ts+2)(—7) '
(18e)
1 —q"(t,s +2) —w"(t,s +2)=max{[i —q(t,s+3) —w(t,s + 3)] (
+z)P}
(181) q"(t,s+2) =q(t,s +3) (
As in Section III, there is only one solution to the system of difference equations
governed by equations (18) which does not violate the boundary condition that no party's
share can exceed one. However, unlike in the two—player game, in the three—player game one
must make stronger assumptions to rule out history—dependent strategies. As Sutton (1986)
discusses, any number of reasonable assumptions will rule out those "perverse" equilibria.
For example, the equilibrium of the finite horizon bargaining game is unique, and approaches
(19) as the horizon becomes very large. Also, (19) is the unique "strong" equilibrium, and
the unique equilibrium when strategies are continuous in the history of the game.
21Equation (18b) embodies the constraint that the U.S. will oniy be allowed to bargain if
it makes positive sidepayments. Equation (18a) embodies the constraint that the country
must do at least as well by rescheduling as it would by going into autarky. When neither
constraint is binding, the equilibrium shares with continuous bargaining (h —+0+)are
7+5 (19a)
(19b) 1—q—w=7+?
37 + 25 + r
As in Section III, an agreement is reached immediately. II the U.S.'s share in (19a) exceeds
its gains from trade, then the U.S. is kept out and the shares are as in Section III. If the
U.S. is in, but the autarky constraint is binding, then the U.S. and the banks split the total
gains from trade evenly. Each gets [(1+ z)P —1]/2.In afl cases, the U.S.'s actual payment
to the country and the banks is Pyi[z —w(1+ z)]. Note that if
(20) zP —(1
z)P2y5(5+ 0,
so that the U.S. is making positive sidepayments in a three-way bargaining-region equilib-
rium, then by equations (9) and (19) it must also be true that
21 (1+z)PV(S+7)—P1i(5+7)0 ( 37+25+?27+5+?>
22 (1 + z)P(r + 7)—P(r+>0 '' 37+25+?27+5+?
sothat both the banks and the country get a larger payoff with the U.S. involved. Thus
there is no conflict in deciding whether or not to bring in the U.S..
If the U.S.'s eventual involvement in the bargaining process is fully anticipated, then
the country will be able to get a larger loan. As in section III, the maximum loan the country
can get depends on the present discounted value of the banks' share in any rescheduling
agreement, or
(23) ?=q(1+z)Pi/r.
22If condition (20) holds, then the amount given by (23) and (19a) is strictlylarger than the
amount dictated by equations (9) and (10).
There is a very important distinction between anticipated U.S. sidepayments, andunan-
ticipated sidepayments. Unanticipated U.S. sidepayments benefit both the banks and the
country. But the benefits of fully anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to the country.
Banks are competitive and earn zero profits on the loan (if there are no surprises). There-
fore, the anticipation of U.S. sidepayments just means that the country can take out a
larger loan, with the U.S. meeting the additional payments. As a detail, we should observe
that the amount given by (23) and (19a) does not exceed the amount given by(10) and
(9) by the full present discounted value of the U.S.'s sidepayments. That is because banks
anticipate that with the U.S. involved, the country will achieve a better bargain for itself
each period. Hence, the country is not able to increase its borrowing by the full capitalized
value of the U.S.'s sidepayments, even though with 6 > r, it would like to.
How can sidepayments can be squeezed out of the U.S., even when it knows that the
banks and the country will arrive at a rescheduling agreement without its help, and that this
agreement will fully protect the U.S.'s gains from trade? The U.S.'s problem is that when
its gains from trade are of the same order of magnitude as the country's, the banks and
the country can exploit the U.S.'s impatience for them to reach anagreement. If the U.S.'s
stakes are large enough, it cannot credibly refuse to bargain. If the U.S. wishes to avoid
making undesired sidepayments, it could tamper with its legal system, but this presumably
would have large negative side effects. if the U.S. desires to give foreign aid to thecountry,
in excess of the sidepayments it would have to make in any rescheduling negotiations, then
the advent of debt merely converts a voluntary gift into a coerced contribution.
Another question which needs to be addressed is why the country needs to use the
banks to exploit its bargaining power in trade vis-a-vis the U.S.. One answer to this is that
U.S. would be unwilling to make a lump-sum transfer unless the country can precommit
not to borrow from the banks. But a deeper answer is that the country can actually use
the banks to its advantage in bargaining with U.S.. To isolate this point, let us temporarily
assume that the country has the same discount rate as the U.S. and the banks; hence lump-
sum loans are not necessary for efficiency. Suppose further that bank loans to the country
are impossible, because U.S. courts will not enforce the contracts. The country may still be
23able to extract a flow of sidepayments from the U.S., by holding up exports at its border.
The country simply refuses to export in any given period until it simultaneously receives
a sidepayment from the U.S.. By bargaining directly with the U.S., the country is able
to get an even split of the total surplus of (1 + z)P/2 (since we have now specified that
the country and the U.S. have equal discount rates). This share is larger than the country
gets under (19b), with banks in the bargaining, and if z> 1, exceeds the country's share
under free trade. But this does not imply that the country would be better off foregoing
bank loans, since any share going to the banks is only a repayment of funds which were
previously loaned to the country. With bank loans, the country gets roughly two-thirds the
surplus instead of one half. The country can more effectively exploit its bargaining power
with the U.S. by bringing in the banks! This perspective is in sharp contrast to the popular
image of the U.S. and the banks teaming up against the country.
In concluding this section, we remark that the U.S.'s sidepayments can take many
forms other than cash payments: military assistance, changes in U.S. immigration and drug
laws, a lowering of tariffs, and so on.
VI. Non-Cooperative Banking Consortiums and Pluralistic Political Parties
Throughout, we have assumed that the banks which make up the banking consortium
act as one monolithic agent, and that the diverse interests which make up the country's
leadership act as another. Clearly these assumptions are not entirely realistic. The point
of this section is to show that the key assumption underlying our earlier analysis concerns
the relative bargaining power of the banks as a whole versus the country's leadership as
a whole. Even though the model does not indicate how payments are split up among the
banks, it can still indicate the determinants of the split between the banks and the country.
To ifiustrate this point, let us return to the model of section III (no uncertainty and
no U.S.). Now suppose that the country has less bargaining power in that it is only able
to make one third of the total offers, instead of half. In other words, the country makes an
offer every third period, and the banks make offers in the other two periods. Following the
same steps as in section III, it is straightforward to show that in a perfect equilibrium (and




24A comparison of (9) and (24) indicates that if equilibrium falls in the bargainingregion,
banks receive a higher payment (roughly 2/3 instead of 1/2 of GNP) when theycan make
two thirds the offers instead of one half the offers.
Let us now assume that instead of there being single banking consortium, thereare
two bank creditors, A and B. Each holds half the country's debt, and each can unilaterally
conduct seizure operations if the country tries to trade without a reschedulingagreement.
If the bargaining process is such that the country and banks take equal turns making offers
(first bank A, then bank B, then the country), then it is straightforward to show that
the country pays each bank q/2, where q is given by equation (24). Suppose instead that
the country bargains evenly against the two banks (first bank A makes an offer, then the
country, then bank B, then the country). Then it is easy to show that the country only
makes total payments as given by (9). Obviously, both sides have an incentive to take
steps to increase their bargaining power. (In this vein, it seems important to recognize that
debtor countries may be able to implicitly coordinate their behavior.)
The real point is that our model, which is based on Rubinstein's work, does not en-
dogenize every conceivable element of the bargaining process. The exogenous elements are
summarized in the percentage of offers each side is allowed to make. Our Rubinstein-type
model does successfully endogenize some aspects of bargaining, such as the effect of relative
discount rates, and of threat points. This would seem to be an advance over "take it or
leave it" models of bargaining, but clearly it would be useful to incorporate richer models
of bargaining into future research on rescheduling agreements.
VII. Conclusions
An implicit assumption in many earlier models of sovereign lending is that banks can
restrict a debtor country's options to two choices: default and full repayment. In thispaper,
we recognize that debtors realistically have a third option, which is to bargain over repay-
ments. Bargaining may be a viable option even in situations where banks have considerable
means to reduce the country's current and future gains from trade. A debtor can bargain
because banks will receive nothing unless the country is allowed to export its goods, and
because while negotiations are proceeding, the goods are depreciating and the banks are
foregoing interest. The level of loans a country can commit to repay thus may be even lower
25than has been previously recognized.
In our model, the only "collateral" a country has to offer is a percentage of its gains
from trade. Banks can inflict this cost on the country because any sovereign borrower
will (in equilibrium) sign contracts maximizing its creditors' legal rights. Exactly how
extensive these rights may be is uncertain31; there is limited legal precedent. There is
little precedent because sovereign repudiations almost never occur; debtors and creditors
find it more efficient to reschedule. In their seminal paper, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
consider the possibility of direct penalties but choose to stress primarily a second incentive
for countries to repay: the threat of financial autarky. Eaton and Gersovitz argue that
the main reason for sovereign borrowing is likely to be short-term consumption smoothing.
Countries lend when their income is high and borrow when it is low. Hence, according
to Eaton and Gersovitz, bank loans to sovereign debtors will typically be repaid quickly.
Countries will try to avoid defaulting because otherwise they will face prolonged financial
autarky; this can be an equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon reputational model. The
threat of financial autarky may be important in some instances and it should be possible
to extend our bargaining framework to incorporate such cases. However, the debt/GNP
ratios listed in the Appendix lead one to be skeptical of whether financial autarky is a
significant consideration for today's major problem creditors. The ratio of debt to GNP for
these major debtors is in most cases greater than fifty percent, and in some cases over one
hundred percent. The loans are patently not short term. It seems totally implausible that
the rulers of these countries have discount rates so low that they will repay these debts over
the next twenty or thirty years, primarily in order to be eligible to borrow (or lend) again
sometime well into the next decade. The supergame short—term consumption smoothing
argument also seems at odds with other aspects of the data. Non—oil developing countries
experienced severe adverse transitory terms of trade shocks at the beginning of the 1980's.32
It is precisely when their income dropped that they stopped being able to borrow. The same
is the case for Mexico, whose ability to borrow fell with falling world oil prices. (Note: If
the country's policymakers are risk—averse, consumption smoothing can occur in a model
31 Kaletsky (1985) conjectures that creditor's legal redress over sovereign default is quite
limited, but recognizes the paucity of legal precedent.
32 At the end of 1985, the World Bank's non-oil commodity price index was down 26
percent from its end of 1980 value. (See World Bank Debt Tables, p. xv.)
26such as ours. However, outside an infinite horizon supergame struture, the desire to smooth
consumption alone will not induce repayments. Legal sanctions are necessary.)
Clearly there does exist somemechanismto induce repayment; otherwise there would
never be periods where banks receive net payments (that is, where a problem debtor's
external liabilities grow at less than the rate of interest). As the Appendix documents,
most of the major problem debtors actually ran trade balance surpluses in 1984. And in
the twelve months ending in June 1985, U.S. bank loans to Argentinagrew at —3.2%, to
Brazil at 3.1%, to Mexico at —3.0%, and to Venezuela at —6.3%. [See Watson et. aI.(1986),
Table 10.] Over this same period, the interest rates on these loans were in the neighborhood
of 12%; hence the banks were receiving net payments.
It would appear quite feasible to extend the model developed here in several dimensions,
in part making use of the growing literature on bargaining theory. We have already discussed
the possibifity of relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption. Also, some of our resultsmay be
sensitive to the assumed information structure. For example, a strong policy conclusion
of our analysis is that the U.S. as a whole would be better off if itsgovernment could
find a way to avoid bargaining with the banks and the country. (This is notnecessarily
possible, as we showed in Section V.) The point is that the banks and the country will
achieve an efficient bargain without U.S. help, and an efficient bargain implies that there
will be no suspension of trade with the U.S.. However, if the country has private information
about its economy or political situation, then a bargain between the banks and thecountry
may be reached only after some delay.33 In this case, there might be a role for a third
party such as the International Monetary Fund (though the role might simply be to convey
information). There are also some empirical puzzles which our model only partly resolves.
Why, for example, did LDC borrowers pay such low risk premia during the seventies?34
Anticipated sidepayments from the U.S. may have been one factor, and one might argue
that the severe adverse movements in LDC's terms of trade and in world interest rates
were largely unanticipated events. Nevertheless, the risk premium puzzle merits further
investigation.
Most models of bargaining with private information conclude either that not all efficient
bargains will take place or that bargaining will involve costly delay. However, there are
examples where this is not the case; see Gui and Sonnenschein (1985). 'SeeFolkerts—Landau (1985) or Edwards (1986).
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29APPENDIX
TEN MAJOR LDC DEBTORS(a)
Average Annual Percent
Total External Liabilities, 1985(b) Exports(C) Trade BalanceGrowth Rates
Total From PrivateDebt/GNP($Bifi.) ($Bill.) (1980—1984)
(U.S. $Bill.)Sources (percent) ratio (1984) (1984) GDPExports(d)
Argentina 50.8 86.8 71.9 8.1 4.0 —1.4 —5.4
Brazil 107.3 84.2 49.7 27.0 13.1 0.1 1.6
Chile 21.0 87.2 126.9 3.6 0.3 —1.1 —11.4
Colombia 11.3 57.5 36.8 4.3 0.3 2.0 —4.0
Mexico 99.0 89.1 60.9 24.0 12.8 1.3 4.4
Morocco 14.0 39.1 111.4 2.2 —1.4 1.3 —8.2
Nigeria 19.3 88.2 22.9 11.8 3.0 —4.3 —22.3
Peru 13.4 60.7 97.9 3.2 1.0 —1.0 —10.5
Phillipines 24.8 67.8 76.1 5.4 —0.7 —0.2 —7.3
Venezuela 33.6 99.5 73.3 15.9 8.7 —1.7 —9.3
(a) Source: Total external liabilities and debt/GNP ratios are from 1985/86 World Bank Debt Tables,p. xxv.
Other data are from September 1986 IMF Financial Statistics, lines 77aad, 77acd, 99a,p, and 99b,p.
(b) Includes all long and short—term debt: public and private guaranteed debt, non-guaranteed private debt,
and IMF credit.
(c) Merchandise exports.
(d) Real export growth is measured in constant 1980 dollars using the U.S. GNP deflator, calculated from lines
99a and 99a.r, p. 512. Data for Morocco are for 1980-1983 only.
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